Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali(1058-1128 C.E.)
Abu Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Shafi'i alGhazali
was born in 1058 C.E. in Khorasan, Iran. His father died while he was still
very young but he had the opportunity of getting education in the prevalent
curriculum at Nishapur and Baghdad. Soon he acquired a high standard of
scholarship in religion and philosophy and was honoured by his appointment as a
Professor at the Nizamiyah University of Baghdad, which was recognised as one
of the most reputed institutions of learning in the golden era of Muslim
history. Muhammad al-Ghazali remains one of the most celebrated scholars in the
history of Islamic thought. His exceptional life and works continue to be
indispensable in the study of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy and
mysticism. The tens of books that he left behind were the result of an
inquisitive mind that began the quest for knowledge at a very early stage. In
the introduction to his autobiographical work Deliverance from Error (Al-Munqidh
min al-Dalal,p. 81), al-Ghazali said: “The
thirst for grasping the real meaning of things was indeed my habit and want
from my early years and in the prime of my life. It was an instinctive, natural
disposition placed in my makeup by Allah Most High, not something due to my own
choosing and contriving. As a result, the fetters of servile conformism fell
away from
me, and inherited beliefs lost their hold on me, when I was
quite young.”
Al-Ghazali’s Life:
Al-Ghazali’s full name is Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad
Ibn Ahmad al-Tusi. He was born in 450/1058 in Tus, Khurasan near Meshhad in
present-day Iran. He bore the title of respect Hujjat al-Islam(Proof of Islam)
for the role he played in defending Islam against the trends of thought that
existed at the time. His father was a wool spinner (ghazzal) and thus, relative
to this profession, al-Ghazali acquired this name. (al-Subki, Tabaqat
al-Shafi`iyyah al-Kubra,vol. VI, pp. 191-193) Although he was born in Tus, a
Persian, non-Arabic land, Al-Ghazali wrote the overwhelming majority of his
works in Arabic, the lingua franca of his world.
Before his death, al-Ghazali’s father entrusted him and his brother
Ahmad to a Sufi friend. He asked him to spend whatever little money he left
behind, to teach them reading and writing.
When the money was finished, the Sufi asked them to join a school
so that they might subsist. According to Al-Subki (Tabaqat, vol. VI, p.195),
schools used to provide room, board and stipend.
Al-Ghazali began studying at Tus where his teacher was Ahmad
Al- Radhakani. His next station was Jurjan where he wrote Al-Ta`liqahfrom the
lectures of Abu Al-Qasim Al-Isma`ili Al-Jurjani. He returned to Tus for three
years only to leave afterwards for Nishapur, where he joined the Nizamiyyah
school and studied under Imam Al-Haramayn Al-Juwaini for eight years until the
death of his teacher in 478 AH/1085 CE. (Al-Subki,
Tabaqat, vol. VI, pp. 195-196) During this period al-Ghazali
excelled in all the Islamic sciences with the exception of the science of the
Hadith; he confessed this in the last paragraph of his work Qanun al-Ta’wil
(The Law of Metaphorical Exegesis). This may have been the reason for the
presence of some unsound traditions in his works, such as the famous Ihya’
`Ulum al-Din (TheRevival of the Islamic Sciences).
After the death of Al-Juwaini, al-Ghazali went to the Camp (Al-Mu`askar)
of vizier Nizam Al-Mulk who founded the Nizamiyyah schools. The Camp was
reputed as a meeting place for scholars who debated in the Islamic sciences.
al-Ghazali won the respect of other scholars and was assigned by Nizam AlMulk
to be the teacher at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad. He lectured there between 484
AH/1091 CE and 488 AH/1095 CE. (Al-Subki, Tabaqat, vol. VI, pp. 196-197) This
position won him prestige, wealth and respect that even princes, kings and
viziers could not match. (Al-Zubaydi, Ithaf, vol. I, p.7)
During this period, al-Ghazali studied philosophy on his own
and wrote Maqasid al-Falasifah(The Aims
of the Philosophers) and appeared as if he was one of them. His critique of
philosophy followed, in a book he called Tahafut AlFalasifah(The Incoherence of
the Philosophers). Almost all scholars tend to generalize and say that
al-Ghazali gave a coup de grace to philosophy in this book. Indeed, few notice
that he was critical of Greek metaphysics and its spread in an “Islamic” dress at
the hands of reputed Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. A
detailed discussion of al-Ghazali’s relationship with philosophy and science
will follow.
The end of al-Ghazali’s career at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad was
unexpected. The circumstances surrounding this event became known as the
“Spiritual Crisis” of al-Ghazali. He discussed the reason that prompted him to
quit his position in Deliverance from Error. After discussing the methodologies
of the Muslim theologians (Al-Mutakallimun), the philosophers
and the esoterics (Al-Batiniyyah), he chose the Sufi path as the way to acquire
indubitable knowledge. He noted though that this method has prerequisites; one
should abandon all worldly attachments. Al-Ghazali thought that, in order to
implement this, he should “shun fame, money and to run away from obstacles.”
(AlMunqidh, p. 134) He made it clear that any deed that was not for the sake of
Allah was an obstacle. Upon scrutinizing his activities,he decided that his
motivation for teaching was not for the sake of Allah. (Al-Munqidh, p. 134) Of
this al-Ghazali said:
“For nearly six months beginning with Rajab, 488 AH [July,
1095 CE], I was continuously tossed about between the attractions of worldly
desires and the impulses towards eternal life. In that month the matter ceased
to be one of choice and became one of compulsion.
(Allah) caused my tongue to dry up so that I was prevented
from lecturing. One particular day I would make an effort to lecture in order to
gratify the hearts of my following, but my tongue would not utter a single word
nor could I accomplish anything at all.” (Hayman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in
the Middle Ages, p. 277)
Al-Ghazali’s health deteriorated and the physicians gave up any
hope for they realized that the source of his problem was not physical. He
“sought refuge with Allah who made it easy for his heart to turn away from
position and wealth, from children and friends.” (Hayman and Walsh, p.278) He
distributed his wealth and departed from
Baghdad to begin a spiritual journey that lasted for about eleven years. He
went to Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, Madinah, Makkah and back to Baghdad where
he stopped briefly. This part of the journey lasted until Jumada AlAkhirah, 490
AH/June, 1097 CE. He continued to Tus to spend the next nine years in seclusion
(Khalwa). He ended his seclusion to teach for a short period at the Nizamiyyah
of Nishapur in 499 AH/1106 CE. From there he returned to Tus where he remained until
his death in Jumada Al-Akhirah, 505 AH/December, 1111 CE. (Abu Sway, M.,
al-Ghazali: A Study in Islamic Epistemology, p. 24)
Yet, before delving into al-Ghazali’s ideas, it is important
to remember that he lived in what might be described as a postgolden age
context. The production of the exact sciences faded away, the Islamic state had
grown into a massive caliphate that faced disintegration as the provincial
governors gained power. Just before al-Ghazali was born, the institution of the
Sultan was introduced or rather forced on Baghdad. The year 450 Al marked the
first time a split in power took place between theSultan, who was the actual
ruler, and the Caliph whose role was reduced to dignitary functions. (Ibn
Kathir, Al-Bidayah wa alNihayah, vol. XII, p. 66)
It was a classical case of a wealthy and powerful
civilization that lost track of its sense of direction and lost sight of its
roots, its source of power. The indulgence in material life had led many celebrities
to abandon public life and to live in seclusion. It was a search for a meaning
of life in asceticism. Sufism thrived before al-Ghazali was born and he
ultimately subscribed to the mystics’ path.
Al-Ghazali’s Thought:
Al-Ghazali was an encyclopedic and prolific scholar. He was trained
as a jurist in the Shafi`i school which is traditionally Ash`arite in its
expression of Islamic faith. He contributed many
books to these fields. In addition, he wrote extensively
about Islamic mysticism. He wrote about politics and the sects of the time, and
he wrote poetry. Yet, in what follows, the discussion will be restricted to his
position on science.
The early works of al-Ghazali were in the area of
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, in Al-Mankhul fi `Ilm al-Usul, a book on usul al-fiqh.
He devoted a chapter to a discussion of the nature of the sciences (al-kalam fi
haqa’iq al-`ulum). It should be noted that alGhazali’s use of the word
“sciences” is general and restricted to
the natural or physical sciences; it covers all subjects of
knowledge including those of the Shari`ah. This chapter included important
insights reflecting his position regarding science. One of these insights was
regarding the definition of `ilm [science].
He said: “science cannot be defined” (inna al-`ilma la hadda
lah).
He explained his statement by saying that it was possible to
know science and that “our inability to define (science) does not indicate our
ignorance about the same science”. (Al-Mankhul, p. 42)
Al-Ghazali divided the sciences or knowledge into eternal and
accidental. Eternal knowledge belongs to God alone. He divided accidental
knowledge into immediate (hajmiyy) and theoretical (nazariyy). The first is the
kind of knowledge that one has to know with the beginning of reason, such as
the existence of the self. On the other hand, theoretical knowledge is the
result of sound thinking (al-nazar al-sahih). Related to this is al-Ghazali’s definition
of reason. He said that it is “the qualification which enables the qualified
[person] to perceive knowledge and to think about the cognizable.” (Al-Mankhul,
pp. 44-45)
While al-Ghazali classified the senses into different
categories in terms of their function in acquiring knowledge, he maintained that
there were no differences between the sciences once knowledge is acquired,
regardless of how difficult the subject of the science is. This view of
al-Ghazali regarding the equality of the sciences, once they are achieved, is
consistent with his position regarding his interchangeable use of the terms
“science” and,“knowledge”. (Al-Mankhul, p. 48)
The first period of public teaching at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad
(478-488 AH/1085-1095 CE) was the time when alGhazali encountered philosophy.
In Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, a biographic work that he wrote towards the end of
his life, he sketched his quest for knowledge. Al-Ghazali reduced the list of
the seekers for knowledge to four groups: the dialectical
theologians (Al-Mutakallimun), the esoterics (al-Batiniyyah), the philosophers,
and the Sufis (Al-Munqidh, p. 89). His discussion of philosophy is the most
relevant to his position on science.
Al-Ghazali stated that in his quest for true knowledge he started
studying philosophy after he was done with `ilm al-kalam, which did not provide
“certain knowledge” (`ilm al-yaqin) he sought. In his introduction to the
section on philosophy he outlined his approach to this new field. He wanted to
pursue philosophy to a level higher than that of the most knowledgeable in the field.
Only then, he argued, could one know the intricate depths of the science, as he
referred to philosophy. (Al-Munqidh, p. 94)
Al-Ghazali was aware that he could not rely on secondary sources,
such as those of the Mutakallimun, in order to study philosophy. For him, their
books included fragmented philosophical words that were complex and
contradictory to one another.
Instead, he decided to read books of philosophy directly
without the assistance of a teacher. Although he was teaching three hundred
students at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad and writing on the
Islamic revealed sciences at the same time, in his spare
time he was able to master philosophy in less than two years. He spent almost
another year reflecting on it. (Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 70) al-Ghazali
wanted the readers, through such a detailed account of his effort, to have
confidence that he had a thorough grasp of philosophy and that his conclusions
are trustworthy.
As a result of his study he wrote two books: Maqasid
alFalasifah (The Aims of the Philosophers) and Tahafut al-Falasifah (The
Incoherence of the Philosophers). It was al-Ghazali’s intention to write a book
that would encompass the thought of the philosophers without criticizing or
adding anything to it. Of this objective, he said:
“I thought that I should introduce, prior to the Tahafut, a
concise account that will include the story of their aims (maqasid) which will
be derived from their logical, natural and metaphysical sciences, without
distinguishing between what is right and what is wrong, without additions and
along with that they believed what they believed as their proofs.” (Maqasid, p.
31)
This book, which is a pioneer work in its attempt to
deliberately present an objective account of the thought of adversaries, was
followed by theTahafut, which included his critique of the contents of the
first one. It was this latter work (i.e.Tahafut alFalasifah) that prompted Ibn
Rushd to write Tahafut al-Tahafut
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence) which constituted a
systematic rebuttal of al-Ghazali’s critique of this mélange of GrecoIslamic
philosophy.
In Maqasid al-Falasifah, al-Ghazali divided the sciences of
the philosophers into four major categories: mathematical (alriyadiyyat),
logical (al-mantiqiyyat), natural (al-tabi`iyyat) and metaphysical
(al-ilahiyyat). (Maqasid, p. 31) He listed politics, economy and ethics as
subdivisions under metaphysics. In alMunqidh min al-Dalal, he listed politics
and ethics as major sections along with the first four. (al-Munqidh, p. 100)
Only mathematics and logic will be discussed here.
Regarding mathematics, al-Ghazali thought that it dealt with
geometry and arithmetic. Neither of these subjects contradicted reason. As a
result, he did not think that he ought to include a detailed account of
mathematics in his book. (Maqasid, pp. 31-32) Knowledge is divided, in the second section of
the book of knowledge ofIhya’ `Ulum al-Din, into `ulum shar`iyyah(sciences of the
Shari`ah) and ghayr-shar`iyyah(non-Shari`ah sciences). To the latter belongs
mathematics and medicine, which al-Ghazali
described as praiseworthy sciences. The latter sciences are
consideredfard kifayah(i.e. there should be enough Muslims who are experts in
the concerned field to the degree that they can fulfill the needs of the
Islamic society). Nevertheless, al-Ghazali criticized unnecessary studies in
mathematics that do not have practical applications. (Ihya’, pp. 16-17)
The fact that al-Ghazali categorized mathematics and
medicine as fard kifayah is a positive position. This means that the society at
large would be committing a sin if they neglect any of these sciences to the
degree the shortage would have negative impact on the society. In fact, he
blamed the students of jurisprudence for their indulgence in minute details of
the Shari`ah. The context indicates that they better study medicine instead of
specializing in issues in jurisprudence that might never prove to be of any
benefit. (Ihya’, vol. I, p. 21) Despite this positive stance, alGhazali did not
remain consistent in his position.
Al-Ghazali had fears that though geometry and arithmetic are
permissible, they might lead a person to blameworthy sciences. (Ihya’, vol. I,
p.22) He did not discuss the reasons that led him to take such a position. It
should be noted that this remark is atypical for al-Ghazali and does not
reflect his general position regarding arithmetic, geometry and the exact
sciences. The context itself might provide some insight as to why al-Ghazali
was cautious in dealing with mathematics and the exact sciences.
During his time, there were no compartmentalized studies,
and every student learned all branches of knowledge. Al-Ghazali was afraid that
a student might be deceived by the accuracy of mathematics and then generalize
and consider all the subjects included in philosophy, including metaphysics, to
be as accurate.
In al-Mustasfa min `Ilm al-Usul, al-Ghazali stated that
arithmetic and geometry are pure rational sciences that are not recommended for
studying. They fluctuate between false, yet plausible guesses, and true
knowledge that yields no practical applications. (Al-Mustasfa, p. 3) This shift
from his early position that studying mathematics is fard `ayn might be
attributed to his acceptance of the Sufi path. Al-Mustasfawas written towards
the end of al-Ghazali’s life when he was deeply absorbed by tasawwuf.
Al-Ghazali did not see any practical application for the
study of physics, and thus declared it useless. He knew that physics is concerned
with substances and their properties, yet he stated that some of the input of
the philosophers contradicted the Shari`ah. (The Book of knowledge, p. 54) Thus
practical application, or rather the lack of it, caused al-Ghazali to reject a
particular science as the above example, or at least criticize it (Ihya’, pp.
16-17). This position should be seen in the context of the civilizational
development of the 5th century AH/11th century CE.
Regarding logic, he defined it as “the law (qanun) that
distinguishes a sound premise and analogy from a false one, which leads to the
discernment of true knowledge.” (Maqasid, p. 36) In reviewing the subjects of
logic, which he believed to be neutral in its relationship with the Shari`ah,
(al-Munqidh, p. 103) al-Ghazali stated that induction (istiqra’) could be
correct only if all parts were covered. If only one part could be different,
then induction in this case could not yield true knowledge.
Al-Ghazali criticized the philosophers on twenty accounts in
the Tahafut. Of relevance to the discussion here is his position on issue
number seventeen, causality. Long before David Hume, alGhazali said that, in
his opinion, “the conjunction (al-‘qtiran) between what is conceived by way of
habit (fi al`adah) as cause and effect is not necessary (laysa daruriyyan).” He
provided a list of pairs that were usually thought of as cause and effect by
the philosophers (e.g. fire and burning, light and sunrise, diarrhea and
laxatives). For him, the conjunction between them was a result of the sequence
in which Allah created them, not because this conjunction was necessary in
itself. Moreover, he thought that it was possible for one of these pairs to
exist without theother.
He did not see any contradiction since these pairs are the phenomena
of nature and nature as such, according to the philosophers own admission, does
not belong to the realm of necessity but that of possibility, which may or may
not exist. (Tahafut, p. 239)
Al-Ghazali criticized the philosophers’ proof of causality because
it was limited to observation (mushahadah) which depends on the senses, a
source of knowledge that he could not accept on its own merit. Thus his
position regarding causality is consistent with his theory of knowledge. Using
the example of fire and burning, he said that “observation could only prove
that burning took place when there was fire, and not by the fire.” He held that
inert and lifeless objects such as fire are incapable of action and thus cannot
be the agent (al-fa`il) that causes burning.
To prove his point, al-Ghazali used a proof, which is
neo-platonic in its tone, from the arguments of the philosophers. They held that
accidents (a`rad) and incidents (hawadith) emanate at the time of contact
between “bodies”, from the provider of forms (wahib al-suwar) whom they thought
to be an angel. Accordingly, one cannot claim that fire is the agent of
burning. In addition, he argued that the agent “creates” burning with his will
(bi’iradatihi). al-Ghazali reduced the problem of causality to that of “will” which
makes it rationally possible for the agent, whom he held to be Allah, not to
create burning even though there is contact. (Tahafut, pp. 242-243)
Al-Ghazali presented this theory of causality in order to allow
room for the existence of miracles (mu`jizat) that were associated with the
prophets, without resorting to allegorical interpretations as the philosophers
did. One of the miracles that he chose as an example was that of Prophet
Ibrahim. The story was that his people attempted to burn him for breaking their
idols by throwing him into fire but no burning took place. In theQur’an (21:69)
it was Allah’s will that the fire would not harm Ibrahim. al-Ghazali maintained
that Allah was the agent (fa`il) of every action, either directly or indirectly
(i.e. by the angels). (Tahafut, pp. 243-247)
Al-Ghazali knew that he could not exhaust all the sciences
in his writings. He had an insight that there are more sciences within reach of
human beings. He said: “It appeared to me through clear insight and beyond
doubt, that man is capable of acquiring several sciences that are still latent
and not existent.” (Jawahir alQur’an, p. 28)
Al-Ghazali’s Impact on Islamic Thought and Beyond:
Al-Ghazali’s status in Islamic thought ranges from being the
“Proof of Islam” and renewer (mujadded) of the fifth century AH, to being
declared a non-believer by some of our contemporary “scholars” (Dimashqiyyah,
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali wal-Tasawwuf). The unfortunate gap between the two
positions reflects the war that ensued between the Sufis and the Salafis, a war
that is almost as old as Islam itself. Al-Ghazali left behind a great number of
books and treatises. According to Abdurrahman Badawi (Mu’allafat
al-Ghazali)seventy-three are definitely his. One of the most celebrated books
is the Ihya’ `Ulum Al-Din (Revival of Islamic
Sciences). al-Ghazali believed that Muslims became entrapped within the minute
details of fiqh. This included scholars as well because to a certain extent
they had lost sight of the original message of Islam. It is in this context
that the Ihya’ poses a challenge to scholars, despite its own flaws that mostly
arise from al-Ghazali’s lacked of sufficient knowledge in the science of
Hadith, as he admitted in Qanun al-Ta’wil. Al-Subki, an
early historian of the Shafi`i school of jurisprudence, listed in Tabaqat
alShafi`iyyah al-Kubramore than nine hundred weak or forged traditions that he
detected in the Ihya’.
Al-Ghazali was the scholar per excellence in the Islamic world.
He had literally hundreds of scholars attending his lectures at the Nizamiyyah
school of Baghdad. His audience included scholars from other schools of
jurisprudence. The list includes
Judge Abu Bakr Ibn Al-`Arabi who was Maliki, Al-Khattabi and Abu Al-Wafa’ Ibn `Aqil who were Hanbalites.
Reflecting the influence of al-Ghazali on the Latin world, Manuel
Alonso listed forty-four medieval philosophers and theologians who made
reference to al-Ghazali. This included Thomas Aquinas who referred to Maqasid
Al-Falasifahthirty-one times (Al-Andalus, XXIII). Needless to say, that
al-Ghazali is still celebrated in many academic institutions in the West, with numerous
orientalists writing about him and translating his books. `Uthman Ka`ak has
related that he found a translated copy of Al-Munqidh min al-Dalalin Descartes’
library in Paris with Descartes’
comments in the margin. The numerous similarities between Al-Munqidh and
Discourse on Method support Ka`ak’s observations. Ka`ak passed away and I have
attempted to locate the book that he mentioned by corresponding with several
libraries in France that contain some of Descartes’ book collection, yet to no
avail.
Conclusion:
Al-Ghazali rejected conformism or uncritical acceptance of any
set of thought including that of the Shari’ah. He sketched his quest for
peremptory knowledge (i.e. `ilm al-yaqin) and the ordeal he had to go through
in order to achieve it. He reviewed the position of many Islamic groups and
others who claimed to be the gate to the knowledge that he sought. His position
regarding the sciences slightly differed from one to the other, and from time
to time. A science, to be sought, has to be in conformity with the Shari`ah,
and has to have practical applications which should prove to be beneficial to
the society. It is apparent that by subscribing to the Sufi path, al-Ghazali
detached himself from the material world including the exact sciences, which
lost whatever status they held in his eyes at one point. Al-Ghazali had a great spirit that roamed and wandered in search of
truth. Though originally his search was not in the area of science per se,
inculcating such a spirit might be a step in the right direction to scientific inquiry.
I began this entry with a quotation from al-Ghazali and I would like to
conclude with one that reflects this spirit and leave it open ended, he said:
“In the bloom of my life, from the time I reached puberty
before I was
twenty until now, when I am over fifty, I have constantly
been diving daringly into the depth of this profound sea and wading into its deep
water like a bold man, not like a cautious coward. I would penetrate far into
every mazy difficulty. I would scrutinize …!”
(Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 62)
Opposing "Jahiliyya"
Al-Ghazali wrote a scathing criticism of the period's
greatest scholars for their fascination with "un-Islamic" Greek
scholars rather than the Qur'ān. Eventually Al-Ghazali's opinion won out and
the clergy censored all outside learning as "Jahiliyya" ignorance and
temptation and demanded that the scholars only study "pure" Islamic
subjects. The Imam described mathematics and medicine as Fard-E-Kefaya;35 he
decisively placed those as secondary to religious-Ilm.36 We find Ghazali's
mindset continuing today in the form of fundamentalist Bucailleists like Zakir
Naik who are obsessed with finding science exclusively in the Qur'ān and
Islamic history, while showing antagonism to people of other faiths. The great
irony is that though they boast most loudly about the Golden Age of Islam, it
is precisely their mindset that deprived the Golden Age of its openness and led
to its decline. An example of this opposition to outside ideas and learning is
seen in medieval Islam's response to the printing press.
Opposition to Printing Press
The printing press was not invented in Europe but in
China, though China never put it to much practical use. When Johannes Gutenberg
invented quality moveable type and printed his first book (the Bible), he
started a global revolution in literacy, education and information
dissemination. Gutenberg described his intentions clearly:
"Religious truth is captive in a small number of
little manuscripts which guard the common treasures, instead of expanding them.
Let us break the seal which binds these holy things; let us give wings to truth
that it may fly with the Word, no longer prepared at vast expense, but
multitudes everlastingly by a machine which never wearies to every soul which
enters life."
"It is a press, certainly, but a press from which
shall flow in inexhaustible streams...Through it, God will spread His Word. A
spring of truth shall flow from it: like a new star it shall scatter the
darkness of ignorance, and cause a light heretofore unknown to shine amongst
men."
Gutenberg's prediction came true; as common people gained
access to scriptures in their mother-tongue, there was a religious revival of
piety, honesty and hard work throughout Europe which laid the foundation for
the economic boom in Northern Europe in the 18th century. According to the
agnostic father of modern sociology, Max Weber, the Protestant revival of
Biblical teaching was responsible for the Industrial Revolution in Northern
Europe.
Soon after Gutenberg's invention of the modern printing
press, Sultan Bayezid II banned it from the Ottoman Empire in 1485, and no
printing press was established in the Arab world for three hundred and fifty
years. During that time, the only printing presses in the Near East were those
run by Christians and Jews. This ban proved disastrous to the development of
science and technology in the Arab world.
The Book of Nature and Book of Revelation
Both Christians and Muslims see two primary sources of
knowledge; the Book of Nature (the natural world around us) and the Book of
Revelation (Divine Scripture). Often people distinguish between these two
‘books', with scripture governing religious ritual and theology, while nature
guides our understanding of natural science and technology, with Scripture as
the primary authority. So how does religion affect scientific progress? Our
approach to studying the Book of Revelation sets a pattern for how we approach
and study the Book of Nature. How we study scripture determines how we study
nature. This is dramatically illustrated in history, where a primary difference
between Islam and Christianity is how they have used scripture. In Islam,
scripture is for memorization and recitation in Arabic, not primarily for
reading and personally interpreting like a normal book. Ijtihad, or personal
interpretation, was not allowed for any major theological matters, and
scripture interpretation was channeled through clerical authority. In fact, the
decline of the Golden Age coincided with the "closing of the gates of
Ijtihad" in the 12th century, when it was said that there was no more need
for personal interpretation. So every aspect of religion was handed to the
common man on a plate, and he was obligated to memorize and recite the Qur'ān ,
not challenge the religious authorities. There was no direct recourse to
scripture for the common man. This attitude that there was "nothing more
to be said" carried over to the study of nature, and, for the vast
majority, academics became nothing more than dead memorization of ancient
scholarship.
In Europe, there was a very similar situation before the
Reformation. The priests controlled doctrine and very few people interpreted
scriptures for themselves, simply obeying the clergy and reciting the
scriptures in a foreign language. With the printing press, common people had
direct access to scripture in their mother-language, and across Europe common
families would read scripture aloud every night. Religion returned to the
pattern of the early Christian Church, and it was believed that personal
understanding and interpretation of scripture was a sacred duty for every
person—a doctrine known as the "priesthood of all believers." This
attitude of doubting human clerics and trusting only the Scriptures carried
over to the scientific realm, where Protestants like Newton, Kepler and Boyle
began to doubt the ancient authorities like Aristotle and interpret nature
directly for themselves. This skepticism of religious authority led to
skepticism of scientific authority, which caused the Scientific Revolution.
Bibliography (Partial List)
Major works by al-Ghazali arranged in chronological order:
1. Al-Mankhul min Ta`liqat al-Usul, ed., Muhammad Hasan
Hitu (Damascus:
Dar Al-Fikr, 1970)
2. Al-Wajiz (Al-Ghuriyya: Matba`at Hush, 1318 AH [1901
CE])
3. Al-Wasit, ed., Ali Muhyi al-Din al-Qarah Daghi, 2
vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Nasr
li al-Tiba`ah al-Islamiyyah, 1984)
4. Fatawa, ed., Mustafa Abu Sway (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC,
1996)
5. Maqasid al-Falasifah, ed., Suleiman Dunya (Cairo: Dar
al-Ma`arif bi-Misr,
1961)
6. Tahafut al-Falasifah, ed., Suleiman Dunya, 7th ed.
(Cairo: Dar al-Ma`arif biMisr, 1961)
7. Mi`yar al-`Ilm fi al-Mantiq, ed., Ahmad Shams al-Din
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-`Ilmiyyah, 1990)
8. Mihak al-Nazar fi al-Mantiq, ed., Muhammad Badr Ad-Din
al-Na`sani
(Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-Hadithah, 1966)
9. Mizan al-`Amal, ed., Suleiman Dunya (Cairo: Dar
al-Ma`arif bi-Misr, 1964)
10. Al-Iqtisad fi Al-I`tiqad, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu
al-`Ula (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Jindi, 1972)
11. Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din, 4 Vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah,
n.d.)
12. Al-Maqsad al-Asna Sharh Asma’ Allah al-Husna, ed.,
Muhammad Mustafa
Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)
13. Bidayat al-Hidayah, ed. Muhammad al-Hajjar (Damascus:
Dar al-Sabuni,
1986)
14. Jawahir al-Qur’an, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula
(Cairo: Maktabat
al-Jindi, 1964)
15. “Al-Madnun bihi `ala Ghayri Ahlih”, Majmu`at Rasa’il
al-Imam al-Ghazali,
vol. IV (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)
16. “Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim” Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam
al-Ghazali, vol. III
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)
17. “Faisal al-Tafriqah bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqah”
Majmu`at Rasa’il alImam al-Ghazali, vol. III (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-`Ilmiyyah,1986)
18. Qanun al-Ta’wil. Published with al-Ghazali’s Ma`arij
al-Quds, ed.,
Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi,
1968)
19. “Ayyuha al-Walad” Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam
al-Ghazali, vol. III (Beirut:
Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)
20. Al-Tibr al-Masbuk fi Nsiyat al-Muluk (Cairo: Maktabat
al-Kulliyyah alAzhariyyah)
21. “Al-Risalah al-Ladunniyyah”, Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam
al-Ghazali, vol.
III (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)
22. Mishkat al-Anwar, ed., `Abd Al-`Aziz `Izz al-Din
al-Siyarawan (Beirut:
`Alam al-Kutub, 1986)
23. Al-Kashf wa al-Tabyin fi Ghurur al-Khalq Ajma`in
(Cairo: Matba`at
Mustafa Muhammad, n.d.) Published with `Abd al-Wahhab
al-Sha`rani’s
Tanbih al-Mughtarrin.
24. Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, eds., Jamil Saliba and Kamil
`Aiyyad, 10th ed.
(Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1981)
25. Al-Mustasfa min `Ilm al-Usul, 2 vols. (Bulaq:
Al-Matba’ah al-Amiriyyah,
1322 A.H.)
26. Al-Imla’ fi Mushkilat al-Ihya’, Appendix, Iyha’ `Ulum
al-Din (Beirut: Dar
al-Ma`rifah, n.d.)
27. Al-Durrah al-Fakhirah fi Kashf `Ulum al-Akhirah.
Published with alGhazali’s Sir al-`Alamin, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula
(Cairo:
Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)
28. Sir al-`Alamin wa Kashf ma fi al-Daryn, ed., Muhammad
Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)
29. Iljam al-`Awam `an `Ilm al-Kalam, ed., Muhammad
al-Musta`sim Billah alBaghdadi (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, 1985)
30. Minhaj al-`Abidin, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula
(Cairo: Maktabat
al-Jindi, 1968)
31. Ma`arij al-Quds fi Ma`rifat al-Nafs (Cairo: Maktabat
al-Jindi, 1968)
Translated Works of al-Ghazali
1. al-Ghazali, The
Book of Knowledge (Kitab al-`Ilm of Ihya` `Ulum al-Din)
ed. and trans., Nabih Amin Faris (Lahore; Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf, 1962)
2. On the Duties of Brotherhood. trans. Muhtar Holland
(Woodstock,
NewYork: The Overlook Press, 1976)
3. Freedon and Fulfillment (Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal),
Published with alGhazali’s “Fada’ih al-Batiniyyah wa Fada’il
al-Mustazhiriyyah”. ed. and
trans., Richard J. McCarthy (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1980)
4. Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship (from Ihya’ `Ulum
al-Din) trans.,
Muhtar Holland (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1983)
5. The Just Balance (Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim), trans. and
ed., D.P. Brewster
(Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1978)
6. The Niche for Lights (Mishkat al-Anwar), trans. and
ed., W.H.T. Gairdner
(Lahore: Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1952)
7. The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God (Al-Maqsad
al-Asna Sharh Asma’
Allah Al-Husna) trans., David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher
(Cambridge: The
Islamic Texts Society, 1992)
8. The Precious Pearl (Al-Durrah al-Fakhirah), trans. and
ed., Jane Idleman
Smith (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979)
9. Letters, trans., Abdul Qayyum (Lahore: Islamic
Publications, 1976)
Other Works:
1. Abu Sway, Mustafa, al-Ghazali: A Study in Islamic
Epistemology (Kuala
Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, 1996)
2. Al-A`sam, `Abd al-Amir, Al-Faylasuf al-Ghazali
(Beirut: Dar al-Andalus,
1981)
3. Badawi, `Abdurrahman, Mu’allafat al-Ghazali, 2nd ed.
(Kuwait: Wakalat
al-Matbu`at, 1977)
4. Laoust, Henri, La Politique De Gazali (Paris:
Librairie Orientaliste Paul
Geuthmer, 1970)
5. Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Al-Imam al-Ghazali bayn Madihih wa
Naqidih (AlMansurah: Dar al-Wafa’, 1990)
6. Al-Sharabasi, Ahmad, al-Ghazali (Beirut: Dar al-Jil,
1975)
7. Al-`Uthman, `Abd al-Karim, Al-Dirasat al-Nafsiyyah
`ind al-Muslimin wa
al-Ghazali bi Wajhin Khas, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat
Wahbah, 1981)
8. Watt, W. Montgomery, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of
al-Ghazali
(Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1963)
9. Zaki, Mubarak, Al-Akhlaq `ind al-Ghazali (Beirut:
Al-Maktabah al-`Asriyyah, n.d.)
10. Al-Zubaydiyy, Murtada, Ithaf al-Sadah al-Muttaqin bi
Sharh Asrar Ihya’
`Ulum al-Din (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-`Arabi,
n.d.)
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